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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

The "EspeciallyHeinous" Standard
Objective Guidance In Capital Cases?
By Daniel Blinka

Gary D. Maynard
V.

WillamThomasCartwright
(Docket No. 87-519)
Argued April 19, 1988
Cruelty and senselessness characterize all murder cases.
Most people would agree, however, that some murders are
more vicious and senseless than others. For the extreme
ases at either end of the continuum, a distinction is easy to
make. But between the extremes is a blurred middle. Some
states allow a death sentence where the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." The question is whether
this standard gives the sentencer any real guidance In determining whether a murderer should die for a crime-or
whether it invites a capricious infliction of the death penalty.
ISSUES
The Supreme Court has been asked to decide whether a
state death penalty statute Is unconstitutionally vague in
characterizing an aggravating factor as a murder committed
In an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" manner. The
Court has been also asked to determine whether a death
sentence must automatically be vacated where the jury found
there was another valid aggravating circumstance.
FACIS
William Thomas Cartwright was tried in the District Court
of Muskogee, Oklahoma, for the first degree murder of Hugh
Riddle and the attempted murder of Riddle's wife, Charma.
The evening of the murder, the Riddles were watching
television. Charma Riddle walked down a hallway toward the
bathroom where she was confronted by Cartwright, a former
employee, who had somehow entered the home. Armed
with a shotgun, Cartwright shot her once in each leg. He
then went into the living room where he killed Hugh Riddle
with a single blast of the shotgun. In the meantime, Charma
Riddle crawled to a bedroom to summon help. Cartwright
found her there, told her that he had killed her husband
because they had fired him and then slit her throat. Charma
Riddle survived the assault and testified against Cartwright.
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The jury convicted him of the murder and the attempted
murder counts.
During the penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury
determined that there were two statutorily specified aggravating factors in this murder: 1) Maynard knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person, and 2) the
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Following Oklahoma procedure, the jury weighed these aggravating factors against the mitigating factors offered by Cartwright and decided that he should die for murdering Hugh
Riddle.
Through a series of appeals, Cartwright brought his case
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed to
decide the validity of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance. The court held that: 1) the
death sentence had to be vacated because it was based on a
constitutionally invalid aggravating circumstance; 2) the
Oklahoma courts failed to apply a constitutionally adequate
narrowing construction in this case, and 3) the federal court
hearing the appeal should not decide what narrowing construction should be applied by the state of Oklahoma. The
Tenth Circuit vacated the death sentence and remanded the
case for a redetermination of the sentence (822 F. 2d 1477
(1987)).
The state of Oklahoma brought this matter to the Supreme Court for review.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In 1972, the Supreme Court effectively abrogated the

capital punishment procedures of thirty-nine states that gave
absolute discretion to the sentencer (judge or jury) to select

life Imprisonment or a death sentence (Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)). Most states immediately reenacted

capital punishment statutes that followed a variety of patterns. The last sixteen years have been marked by a fierce
legal struggle in which opponents of capital punishment
have assailed the validity of these procedures In state and

federal courts. Several times, the Supreme Court has attempt.
ed to clarify Furman and balance the Constitution's tolerance of the death penalty with its demand that it be imple-

mented fairly and justly.
Four years after Furman, the Court held that the death

penalty must be implemented with procedures that guarantee that the sentencer's discretion is "guided" and a death
sentence based on objectively defined and acceptable criteria. The goal is to lessen the risks of "wholly arbitrary and
capricious actions" (Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
PREVIEW

Seeking to address these concerns, states enacted statutes
that attempted to channel the sentencer's discretion through
various procedural devices-such as statutes defining aggra.
vating and mitigating circumstances that characterize
murders.
Although the specifics vary greatly from state to state,
generally the intent was to enumerate aggravating circumstances that set certain murders apart from other murders. In
short, the idea was to distinguish the murders that call for the
death penalty from those that do not. This has been no easy
task. Such categorization of future murders uses general
language. This language has invited attacks that legislatures
have so broadly worded certain aggravating circumstances
that they fall to perform their function of objectively determining which murders are subject to the death penalty.
In Cartwright's case, the jury found that the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The federal court of
appeals determined that this "especially heinous" factor,
which has been labeled the "standardless standard" by one
critic, failed to provide the sentencing jury with objective
guidance as to when to Impose the death penalty. The court
also observed that the Oklahoma courts had failed to provide
a sufficiently narrowing construction of this phrase that
might have tempered the statute's broad wording.
The Supreme Court's decision to review the adequacy of
the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance will affect
not only the validity of the Oklahoma statute, but will also
have an Impact on about twenty other states that use similar
statutory language. Such concern Isevidenced by the amicus
brief in support of the statute submitted by the attorneys
general of fifteen states.
Many state authorities contend that the Constitution tolerates some subjectivity In sentencing and that lower federal
courts have overstepped their bounds In regulating state
criminal law. They also assert that the "especially heinous"
language Is sufficiently precise In that sentencers ought to be
allowed to consider the attitude of the killer, the manner of
the killing and the suffering of the victim when deciding
whether to impose the death sentence. In particular, the
Court has been asked to decide whether the "especially
heinous" standard requires proof that the victim suffered
physically before dying-or whether mental suffering may
be sufficient to warrant the death penalty.
Another issue potentially before the Court is more techni.
cal. It poses the problem of the validity of a death sentence
which is only partially based on an invalid aggravating
circumstance. The Supreme Court has addressed this question under Georgia and Florida law and Indicated that such a
sentence might be valid under those statutory schemes.
However, Oklahoma's capital sentencing procedure Is different from those in Georgia and Florida, so those earlier cases
might not control.
ARGUNMENT
For Gary D. Mayna4 The Rte of Oklaboma (Counsel of
Recort4 Robert H. Henry, 112 State CapitolBuilding OklaIssue Na 14

homa City, OK 73105; telephone (405) 521-3921)
1. Since the evidence was sufficient to support findings by
the jury and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that
the shotgun murder here was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," the death sentence should not be set
aside on the purported ground that the sentencer's discretion was not adequately channeled by this sentencing
guideline.
A. The definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" should not be limited to whether the victim has
suffered physical or mental torture. It Is appropriate
for the sentencer to consider the manner of the killing
and the attitude of the killer.
B. The requirement that the aggravating circumstance
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" be Interpreted in a principled manner has no purpose since the
Court in other cases has approved aggravating circumstances that are more vague and because the sentencer can also consider both nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and evidence of any mitigating circumstance.
2. The jury's finding of a second aggravating circumstancethat Maynard knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person-genuinely narrowed the classes
of those eligible for the death sentence so that Imposing
it was constitutional.
For Wiam Thomas Carfwrgbt (Counsel of Record,
Mandy Welch, 1660 Cross CenterDrive, Norman, OK 73019;
telepone (405) 325-3128)
1. The Eighth Amendment requirement that the states narrow the class of those eligible for the death sentence by
setting out clear and objective standards applies to Oklahoma's use of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
cicumstance.
2. Oklahoma Ignores the court of criminal appeals' subsequent admission that Its construction of the "especially
heinous" circumstance in Cartwrghtdid not adequately
narrow the class of cases in which the death penalty may
be applied.
3. Oklahoma's complaints about the Tenth Circuit's opinion
are no more than thinly veiled expressions of dissatisfaction with the narrowing requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.
AMICUS ARGUMENIM

In &"oftofGaryD. Maynar
Alabama and fourteen other states (Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming) jointly filed a brief arguing that subjectivity in sentencing is not unconstitutional and that the
"especially heinous" standard adequately channeled the
sentencer's discretion where the state appellate court set
guidelines for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
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